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OPPRESSION AS A STATUTORY GROUND
FOR CORPORATE DISSOLUTION
By statute in twelve states," a minority shareholder, alleging op-
pression by directors or controlling shareholders, may bring an ac-
tion for dissolution of the corporation.2  Although this relief has
been available since 1933 in Illinois,3 and subsequently has been in-
corporated in the Model Business Corporation Act4 and the other
statutes noted, it has received scant judicial attention. Explainable
in part, perhaps, by the availability of other more definitive grounds
for dissolution in the same statutes,5 the disuse of the "oppression"
provisions seems to conform to a general pattern of judicial
rigidity and disfavor underlying the remedy of involuntary dissolu-
tion.6 The potential significance of the provision, particularly in the
ItALA. CODE tit. 10, § 21 (78) (Supp. 1961); ALAsKA STAT. § 10.05.540 (1962); ILL. REv.
STAT. cl. 32, § 157.86 (1953); IowA CODE ANN. § 496A.94 (1962); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.485
(1952); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-21-16 (1960); ORE. Rxv. STAT. § 57.595 (1961); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-1107 (1958); TFX. Bus. CoRp. Act art. 7.05 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 16-10-92 (Supp. 1963); VA. CQDE ANN. § 13.1-94 (1956); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.86
(Supp. 1963).
2 Almost all states now provide some statutory basis for involuntary dissolution.
Most of the statutes which make "oppression" a ground for dissolution have been
patterned on the Model Business Corporation Act, which, in turn, was based exten-
sively on the Illinois Business Corporation Act. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 90
(1953) provides in part: "The - courts shall have full power to liquidate the
assets and business of a corporation: (a) In an action by a shareholder when it is estab.
lished: (I) That the directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate
affairs.., and that irreparable injury to the corporation is being suffered or is threat-
ened by reason thereof; or (2) That the acts of the directors or those in control of the
corporation are illegal, oppressive or fraudulent; or (3) That the shareholders are
deadlocked in voting power, and have failed, for a period which includes at least two
consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect successors to directors whose terms have ex-
pired or would have expired upon the election of their successors; or (4) That the
corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted." (Emphasis added.)
'ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.86 (1953).
ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRp. AcT § 90 (1953).
The Model Business Corporation Act includes as alternative grounds for dissolu-
tion: director deadlock, illegal or fraudulent acts by directors or controllers, share-
holder deadlock, and misapplication or waste of assets. See note 2 supra. For additional
grounds provided for under some of the Model Act type statutes, see ALA. CODE tit. 10,
§ 21 (78) (a) (4) (Supp. 1961) (cessation of ordinary business); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 2852-1107 (A) (1) (1958) (failure or abandonment of corporate purposes); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 17-36.86 (a) (5) (Supp. 1963) (forfeiture of charter); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.86
(a) (5) (Supp. 1963) (failure to make annual reports).
6 On dissolution at the instance of a shareholder, see generally BALLANTINE, CoRroRA-
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area of the close corporation, seems to warrant an inquiry into the
dimensions of "oppression." The purpose of this comment is
to ascertain in the decisions, both at common law and under the
statutes, the substance of this rather nebulous concept; to indicate
factors which weigh upon the appropriateness of dissolution in
situations in which oppression has been found; and to suggest the
particular utility of the provision in liberalizing the remedy of dis-
solution.
COMMON LAW CONTEXT
Involuntary dissolution provisions in business corporation acts
have been enacted in the face of a traditional judicial reluctance to
interfere in corporate affairs. Where nonstatutory relief has been
granted to an aggrieved shareholder, it has usually been in the form
of an accounting for waste, removal of miscreant directors, or a bat-
tery of remedies other than dissolution.7 Historically, courts dis-
claimed even an inherent equitable power to dissolve a solvent
corporation," and many states still cling to this view.9 However, in
light of a proliferation of exceptions and reversed positions, pos-
session of inherent power to dissolve is now regarded as the general
rule.10 Even where common law courts were prepared to dissolve
TIONS §§ 304-06 (1946); 2 'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRAGTICE §§ 9.01-29
(1958); TINGLE, THE STOcKHoLrna's REMEDy OF CORPORATE DISSOLUTION (1959).
7See Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate Abuse-Judicial Power to Wind up a
Corporation at the Suit of a Minority Stockholder, 40 COLUM. L. REv. 220, 236-38
(1940).
'Neall v. Hill, 16 Cal. 146 (1860). Annot., 43 A.L.R. 242 (1926); Annot., 61 AL.R.
1212 (1929); Annot., 91 A.L.R. 665 (1934).
'E.g., Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 Ill. App. 2d 29, 184 N.E.2d 792 (1962).
10 "There has been a change in rule, and the new rule-that equity has power and
will exercise it in appropriate cases-is supported by an overwhelming weight of care-
fully-reasoned authority." Hornstein, supra note 7, at 220-21.
The lengthy annotations cited supra note 8 set forth numerous cases in which
courts have declared that they possessed "no inherent power" to order dissolution of a
solvent corporation. Departures from this position, beginning with Miner v. Belle Isle
Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892), were first regarded as mere aberrations or
exceptions to the general rule. Exceptions continued to be made, until, finally, many
courts firmly announced their inherent jurisdiction to order dissolution. See TINGLE,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 34 n.71.
Professor Hornstein and others suggested that courts frequently have failed to
distinguish between power to dissolve in any case and advisability of dissolving in a
particular case. Hornstein, supra note 7, at 221.
The question of inherent equitable power has not become necessarily academic by
the passage of statutes such as those being considered in this comment. It is not always
clear whether the statutory remedy is exclusive. Courts of some states have indicated
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going corporations, however, they invariably labeled the action
"drastic."' 1 Only in the absence of another appropriate remedy
would that particular solution be adopted. The decrees were
dependent upon a showing of imminent disaster, inevitable ruin,
or at a minimum, prospects for serious loss in the near future.12
Numerous attempts have been made to catalogue the decisive
grounds of the common law decisions.' 3 Fraud, deadlock and mis-
application of assets have all been advanced as supporting common
law dissolution decrees. 14 Each of these grounds is incorporated in-
dependently in Model Act type statutes.'5 On the other hand,
neither misconduct, gross mismanagement, failure of corporate pur-
poses, abandonment, nor dissension, all of which have justified a
shareholder's petition for dissolution under the common law,'0 is
included specifically in the "oppression" statutes.'7 However, while
the transition is somewhat tenuous, the inclusion of the word "op-
pressive" in the Model Act type statutes may serve the purpose of
incorporating these grounds into the dissolution statutes. Without
undue violence to its familiar meaning, the single word "oppressive"
would seem to cover most of the situations characterized by these
classifications of common law decisions.
The fact that "misconduct" and "gross mismanagement" may
that the statute alone establishes a basis for reiief. E.g., Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg.
Corp., supra note 9; Milgram v. Jiffy Equip. Co., 362 Mo. 1194, 247 S.W.2d 668 (1952).
But in other states, relief may -not be limited to statutory grounds. See, e.g., Dorf v.
Hill Bus Co., 140 NJ. Eq. 444, 54 A.2d 761 (Ct. Err. & App. 1947); Guaranty Laundry
Co. v. Puliiam, 200 Okla. 185, 191 P.2d 975 (1948).
"'E.g., First Natl Bank v. Fireproof Storage Bldg. Co., 199 Iowa 1285, 202 N.W. 14
(1925).
12 Dixie Lumber Co. v. Heliams, 202 Ala. 488, 80 So. 872 (1919) (serious loss in the
near future and eventual ruin); Benedict v. Columbus Constr. Co,, 49 N.J. Eq. 23, 23
Ad. 485 (Ch. 1892) (eventual ruin); Hall v. City Park Brewing Co., 294 Pa. 127, 143
Ad. 582 (1928) (inevitable ruin).
' See, e.g., 41 MicH. L. REv. 714 (1943); 28 N.C.L. REv. 313 (1950).
14 Numerous cases indicate that fraud and/or misapplication of assets may justify
dissolution. Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 64 F.2d 817
(4th Cir. 1933); Henry v. Ide, 208 Ala. 33, 93 So. 860 (1922); Holden v. Lashley-Cox
Land Co., 316 Mich. 478, 25 N.W.2d 590 (1947); Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97,
53 N.W. 218 (1892); Green v. National Advertising & Amusement Co., 137 Minn. 65,
162 N.W. 1056 (1917); Goodwin v. Von Cotzhausen, 171 Wis. 351, 177 N.W. 618 (1920).
Where shareholders or directors are deadlocked, courts frequently have recognized
the appropriateness of dissolution. E.g., Bowen v. Bowen-Romer Flour Mills Corp., 114
Kan. 95, 217 Pac. 301 (1923). Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 1260, 1264 (1950).
25 See note 2 supra.
10 See notes 18-22 infra.
17 See note 2 supra. But see note 5 supra.
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constitute elements of "oppression" scarcely helps define the term
under inquiry, however, since the meanings of these component parts
are themselves very broad. But some substance has been injected
into these terms by decisions which have held that majority actions
such as plundering the corporation, siphoning off profits through
excessive salaries to themselves as officers, and running the corpora-
tion for the sole benefit of the majority, constitute misconduct or
gross mismanagement justifying dissolution.' 8
Failure of corporate purposes, abandonment, and dissension are
somewhat more useful concepts in determining what constitutes
"oppression" within the meaning of the Model Act statutes. Con-
tinuation of the corporate existence after the purposes of incorp6ra-
tion have failed may well be oppressive to one group of share-
holders.' There are several holdings to the effect that under such
11The cases in this area frequently overlap those involving fraud and waste of
assets. See note 14 supra. Several cases, however, are demonstrative of situations in
which misconduct and mismanagement were emphasized in authorizing dissolution.
In Tri-City Elec. Service Co. v. Jarvis, 206 Ind. 5, 185 N.E. 136 (1933), the majority
shareholder of a two man corporation misappropriated corporate assets, refused to
pay dividends, and excluded the minority shareholder from management. The court
approved findings below that the managing shareholder was "not a fit or suitable per-
son to further act in the capacity of managing agent... of said corporation, and that
its business affairs cannot be entrusted to him without involving said corporation in
further financial loss." Id. at 15, 185 N.E. at 139. In Klugh v. Coronaca Milling Co.,
66 S.C. 100, 44 S.E. 566 (1902), the majority shareholder and principal officer managed
a close corporation without consulting the board of directors or minority shareholders,
paid himself larger dividends, accepted another job and neglected the corporation,
and lost customers for the corporation. Hampton v. Buchanan, 51 Wash. 155, 98 Pac.
374 (1908), involved a majority shareholder and managing officer in a close corporation
who raised his own salary to absorb profits and deprived the minority of any voice in
management. Accord, Riley v. Callahan Mining Co., 28 Idaho 525, 155 Pac. 665 (1916);
Brent v. B. E. Brister Sawmill Co., 103 Miss. 876, 60 So. 1018 (1912); Patton v. Nicholas,
154 Tex. 385, 279 S.W.2d 848 (1955).
A line of Commonwealth cases holds that if misconduct is of a nature and to an
extent that it would create a "justifiable lack of confidence," then dissolution will be
ordered. E.g., Loch v. John Blackwood, Ltd., [1924] A.C. 783 (P.C.) (B.W.I.).
19 The purposes for which the corporation was chartered may have become illegal.
Frequently, with the assets idled, the majority shareholders are in a position to profit
at the expense of the minority. Hall v. City Park Brewing Co., 294 Pa. 127, 143 Ad.
582 (1928) (Volstead Act thwarted brewing company purposes. But see Benedict v.
Columbus Constr. Co., 49 N.J. Eq. 23, 23 Ad. 485 (Ch. 1891), where it was unsettled
whether the law had made the corporate purpose illegal. Changed conditions may have
made corporate purposes undesirable if not absolutely unattainable. O'Connor v.
Knoxville Hotel Co., 93 Tenn. 708, 28 S.W. 308 (1894) (business and population
exodus frustrated corporation organized to build hotel). Some courts have suggested
that, in a broader sense, the corporate purpose is to make a profit, and that impossi-
bility of future profitable operations might contribute to a justification for dissolution.
Kroger v. Jaburg, 231 App. Div. 641, 248 N.Y. Supp. 387 (1931) (business obsolete and
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circumstances the majority has a duty to seek voluntary dissolution.20
Similarly, where the majority had abandoned the active pursuit of
corporate ends, usually with attendant waste of assets and dispro-
portionate personal benefit to the majority, courts have granted a
petition for dissolution.21 Dissension, to the extent that the conduct
of corporate affairs has become ruinously encumbered and ineffective,
has also figured prominently in the decisions.22
Common law courts, in ordering dissolution, have often spoken
of the "fiduciary duty" owed by the majority shareholders to the
minority.23 This "fiduciary relationship" may also be an important
majority shareholders refrained from dissolving in order to benefit themselves). But see
Manufacturers' Land & Improvement Co. v. Cleary, 121 Ky. 403, 89 S.W. 248 (1905);
Stott Realty Co. v. Orloff, 262 Mich. 375, 247 N.W. 698 (1933). The court stated in
Riley v. Callahan Mining Co., 28 Idaho 525, 545, 155 Pac. 665, 672 (1916). that a
corporation "is only another means of associating men together... for the achieve-
ment of a certain purpose, and when the purpose has manifestly failed, the compulsion
to remain associated may as well be relaxed."
2°E.g., Holden v. Lashley-Cox Land Co., 316 Mich. 478, 484, 25 N.W.2d 590, 592
(1947).
2"[W]here the corporation has been abandoned by its shareholders... and is,
therefore, powerless to protect its assets and to discharge its duty to the stockholders
as their trustee, minority stockholders who are cestui que trust,... [may be entitled to
dissolution]." Noble v. Gadsden Land & Improvement Co., 133 Ala. 250, 254, 31 So.
856, 857 (1901) (land speculation corporation abandoned by majority after boom
era passed with assets being depleted by taxes); Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Kennerly Coal &
Coke Co., 300 Pa. 479, 150 At. 902 (1930) (coal mining corporation abandoned for
twenty-five years and merely continued to hold real estate). But see Central Land Co.
v. Sullivan, 152 Ala. 360, 44 So. 644 (1907).
.2 Although one writer has suggested that dissension is not an independent ground
for dissolution, even he admitted that it was frequently an important element. 41
MICH. L. Rxv. 714, 720 (1943). In a large number of cases, it would seem that courts
have considered bickering, bitterness and enmity to be crucial factors. "There are
many authorities which uphold the power of a court of chancery to dissolve a corpora-
tion because of dissensions of so serious a character as under the circumstances will
inevitably defeat the purpose for which it was created." Flemming v. Heffner &
Flemming, 263 Mich. 561, 568, 248 N.W. 900, 902 (1933) (citing authorities), In
Green v. National Advertising & Amusement Co., 137 Minn. 65, 162 N.W. 1056 (1917),
the court focused upon "irreconcilable differences," "mutual hostility and enmity,"
"wrangling" and a situation that precluded an "amicable operation." Nelson v. United
Elevators Co., 115 Kan. 567, 223 Pac. 814 (1924); Graham v. McAdoo, 135 Ky. 677, 123
S.W. 260 (1909); Hlawati v. Maeder-Hlawati Co., 289 Pa. 233, 137 AtL. 235 (1927); Nash-
ville Packet Co. v. Neville, 144 Tenn. 698, 235 S.W. 64 (1921). But see Dorf v. Hill Bus
Co., 140 NJ. Eq. 444, 54 A.2d 761 (Ct. Err. & App. 1947). Dissension and deadlock
are frequently related grounds for dissolution. Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 1260 (1950).
Conceivably, in a situation characterized by extreme dissension, a mere refusal by
the majority to dissolve might be deemed "oppressive" under the statutes, without a
showing that the acts of the majority precipitated the dissension. See Kroger v.
Jaburg, 231 App. Div. 641, 248 N.Y. Supp. 387 (1931).
23E.g., Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919)
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element in an action for dissolution under the "oppression" statutes.
Controlling shareholders are not regarded as fiduciaries, in the classic
sense, at common law or under the statutes; but general concepts of
fiduciary law are frequently used in characterizing conduct by the
majority that entitles the minority to relief.24 It would be stretching
a point to say that the terms "oppression" and "breach of fiduciary
duty" are identical, but there does seem to be substantial correlation
between the two. Identical conduct may be deemed "oppressive"
in one opinion and a "breach of fiduciary duty" in another.25 In
other opinions the terms may be used almost interchangably.2 6 How-
ever, it would seem that a minor breach of a fiduciary duty, justify-
ing some relief, might not be of such proportions as to be appro-
priately considered oppressive. Again it would be useless to suggest
that one uncertain and indefinite term means the same as another.27
(fiduciary relationship); Noble v. Gadsden Land & Improvement Co., 133 Ala. 250,
31 So. 856 (1901) (trust relationship). The leading case declarative of the fiduciary
duty, although not involving dissolution, is Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483
(1919), where it was stated that "the majority has the right to control; but when it
does so, it occupies a fiduciary relation toward the minority, as much so as the corpora-
tion itself or its officers and directors." Id. at 487-88.. See generally Berle,. Corporate
Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1049 (1931); Lattin, Equitable Limita-
tions on Statutory or Charter Powers Given to Majority Stockholders, 30 Mmii. L. REv.
645 (1932); Lattin, The Minority Stockholder and intra-Corporate Conflict, 17 Iowa
L. REv. 313 (1932).
2, "[I]t is dear that the controlling stockholders are not fiduciaries in the strict
sense; and indeed they could not be, for the classic fiduciary concept is incompatible
with the principle that stockholder majorities shall effectively govern. However, the
vocabulary and some of the content of the law of fiduciaries are employed to deal with
instances of oppression." Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARv. L. Rlv. 986,
1015 (1957).
"The so-called fiduciary role of the insiders is invoked by the courts when selfishly
motivated conduct exceeds certain bounds of fairness," as where a transaction "yields
what are deemed unconscionable advantages to the insiders." Id. at 1014-15. Compare
TINGLE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 41, where the author half seriously suggests the
dichotomy "enough oppression"-"not enough oppression" as the test for justifying
dissolution.
2r Compare Barrett v. Smith, 185 Minn. 596, 242 N.W. 392 (1932), with Cullen v.
Governor Clinton Co., 279 App. Div. 483, 110 N.Y.S.26 614 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (directors
voting excessive salaries to themselves as officers).
21 For example, in Bowen v. Bowen-Romer Flour Mills Corp., 114 Kan. 95, 98, 217
Pac. 301, 303 (1923), the court talked at length about the majority's breach of trust,
and then went on to say that "one group of belligerents has possession of the corporate
property and control of its business affairs, and is taking advantage of the opportunity
to oppress the other group." (Emphasis added.)
27Justice Frankfurter pointed out in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86
(1945), that "to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction
to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a
fiduciary?"
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"Fiduciary duty," for example, may mean that the corporation must
be conducted "bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole,' 28
or "breach of fiduciary duty" may involve "an overreaching of the
minority at their expense either in material goods or interests which
the law has deemed sufficiently important to recognize." 29 "Op-
pression," as used in a related but not identical context,30 has been
found variously to suggest "burdensome, harsh and wrongful con-
duct,"3' "a lack of probity and fair dealing in the affairs of a com-
pany to the prejudice of some of its members,13 2 or "a visible depar-
ture from the standards of fair dealing, and a violation of fair play
on which every shareholder who entrusts his money to a company
is entitled to rely."33 Indeed the difficulty of finding a consistent
definition is perhaps symptomatic of what seems to be the useful
versatility of both the terms "fiduciary duty" and "oppression."
While the courts and writers have been notably unsuccessful in
articulating a viable definition of either of the terms, they have
addressed themselves at length to the extent of the duties required by
the fiduciary relationship.34 In determining whether oppression
exists in an action under the statutes, a similar approach may be
taken to delimit the duties owed to the minority, the violation of
28 McPherson, Oppression of Minority Shareholders, Part 1, Common Law Relief,
36 Ausm. L.J. 404, 410 (1963).
2OLattin, The Minority Stockholder and Intra-Corporate Conflict, 17 IoWA L. R~v.
313, 337 (1932).
80 There ate numerous cases construing the word "oppression" as it appears in § 210
of The [British] Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38. In essence, § 210 recog-
nizes that in certain cases involuntary dissolution might be justified, but nonetheless
unsatisfactory to complainants themselves. In such a situation and where it is shown
that "the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner oppressive to somne
part of the members," the court under § 210 is authorized to make certain alternative
orders for the relief of minority shareholders. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
8
" Scottish Co-op. Wholesale Soc'y, Ltd. v. Meyer, [1958] 3 All E.R. 66, 71 (H.L.).
11 Id. at 86.
8 Elder v. Elder & Watson, Ltd., [1952] Sess. Cas. 49, 55.
3, The concept of fiduciary obligations is an expanding one. See Perlman v.
Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). Many types
of conduct have already been declared violative of the fiduciary relationship. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., 144 Fed. 765 (8th Cir. 1906) (majority share-
holders' sale of corporate property for personal gain at expense of minority); Guth v.
Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (director purchasing property
for purpose of resale to corporation); Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch.
47, 156 Ad. 183 (Ch. 1931) (majority shareholders' duty to require fair terms and
equality of participation in merger); Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903)
(failure of directors to disclose inside information in sale of shares); Elliott v. Baker,
194 Mass. 518, 80 N.E. 450 (1907) (directors manipulating control by issuance of
treasury stock). See LATIN, CoRwoRAmoNs, 250-54, 271, 513-15 (1959).
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which might be deemed "oppressive." The concept that there are
limitations on the power of controlling shareholders and directors
is unmistakably implicit in both terms. What those limits are may
depend upon what courts find to be the reasonable expectations
of the minority in particular situations.P
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTES
Only three recent Illinois cases have given extensive consideration
to the term "oppressive" as it appears in the dissolution statutes,8 s
and in only one of these was the conduct complained of deemed
"oppressive.""' The judicial interpretations of the provision by the
Illinois courts underscore a reliance upon the common law, but indi-
cate some movement and development that should not be overlooked.
As at common law, the Illinois courts, even in the process of order-
ing dissolution under the oppression provision, are quick to add that
a "drastic" remedy has been dispensedM The courts still warn that
"'Even though directors may be vested with responsibility for managing the
corporate affairs, and certain percentages of shareholders empowered to make certain
fundamental changes, "that should not mean, however, that the directors or the ma-
jority shareholders should be permitted to exercise their powers arbitrarily or without
regard to the legitimate expectations of the minority shareholders" O NAns, op. it.
supra note 6, § 8.07, at 107-08.
Permissible conduct by the directors and shareholders would seem to be limited
by statutes, judicial decisions, and the charter and by-laws of the corporation. In addi-
tion, shareholder agreements, dealing with employment, control, dividends, and the
like, are becoming more common and are receiving wider acceptance by the omurts.
•ON7EAL, supra, § 5.05, at 231. These agreements frequently serve to clarify and secure
the expectations of the parties and may further proscribe conduct by the directors
and majority shareholders. These agreements may be written or oral. As a seemingly
logical extension, courts might, even in the absence of specific agreement, imply
certain restrictions on director and majority shareholder action, based on the expecta-
tions reasonably contemplated by the parties. See Standard Intl Corp. v. McDonald
Printing Co., 159 N.E.2d 822, 824 (Ohio C.P. 1959), where the court recognized that
the organizing shareholders of a dose corporation had clearly contemplated limita-
tions on the transfer of shares, and justified its decision on grounds that it would
"perpetuate the company on the basis it had originally been set up."
2' Gidwitz v. Lanrit Corrugated Box Co., 20 IlL 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960);
Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis. 10 Ill. 2d 566, 141 N.E.2d 45 (1957); Polikoff
v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 111. App. 2d 29. 184 N.E.2d 792 (1962). In several
other cases under Model Act type statutes, "oppression" was asserted along with other
allegations and was summarily dealt with by the courts. Jesser v. Mayfair Hotel Inc.,
316 S.W.2d 465 (Mo. 1958); Lush'us Brand Distribs., Inc. v. Fort Dearborn Lithograph
Co., 330 11. App. 216, 70 N.E2d 737 (1946); Long v. Wilson Stove & Mfg. Go., 277
IlL App. 57, 188 N.E. 411 (1933).
&T Gidwitz v. Lan it Corrugated Box Co., supra note 36.
34 Gidwitz v. Lanrit Corrugated Box Co., 20 I1. 2d 208, 170 N.E2d 131 (1960);
Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 111. App. 2d 29, 184 N.E.2d 792 (1962).
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the granting of dissolution may give unjustified dominance to the
will of the minority. 9 They have reemphasized that they are un-
willing to be a party to speculative maneuvering and will not readily
interfere with the majority shareholders' timing in the disposition
of corporate assets.40
Despite the traditional warnings, certain language in the Illinois
decisions would seem to indicate that some of the time honored
strictures may be eased under the "oppression" statutes. The show-
ing of inevitable ruin is no longer a prerequisite to dissolution in
Illinois.41 Mere continued corporate existence in the absence of
prospective profitable operation might in an appropriate case con-
stitute "oppression. '42  The overall emphasis seems to be on the
"cumulative effects of... many acts and incidents, and their... con-
tinuing nature." 43 The recital of numerous acts of misconduct in-
volving the sole asset of the corporation, coupled with disproportion-
ate loss to the minority, may constitute a claim of "oppression." 44
'
9 Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., supra note 38.
"Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 I1. 2d 566, 141 N.E.2d 45 (1957);
Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 Ill. App. 2d 29, 184 N.E.2d 792 (1962). In
Polikoff, the principal asset of the corporation was a building containing a hotel, a
theatre and several stores in downtown Chicago. The theatre had remained idle for an
expended period of time. Continued payments toward retiring a loan that had been
made to the corporation by the wife of defendant Grundman, who was president and
majority shareholder, were uncertain. The loan was secured by a mortgage on the
property, and plaintiff feared the loss of the building to Mrs. Grundman. The com-
plaint alleged that various acts of Mr. Grundman in his "doubly dominant" position
were "oppressive." But the appellate court affirmed the lower court's dismissal. In
Davis, the majority shareholder of a hotel corporation resisted dissolution. Plaintiff,
holder of 4098 out of 7250 shares of preferred stock, alleged that the corporation had
accumulated dividends of just over $1,000,000, that the operating history of the
company indicated that it would never make a profit sufficient to pay accrued dividends,
and that refusal to liquidate the corporate assets worth $1,753,000 (by plaintiff's
appraisal) was oppressive. The court refused to dissolve the corporation.
It is submitted that the result in Davis is clearly warranted. Plaintiffs there held
only ten out of 8000 shares of common stock, and there was no evidence of bad faith
on the part of defendants. It would seem that the result in Polikoff is less tenable.
See note 44 infra.
" "The word 'oppressive' does not carry an essential inference of imminent dis-
aster; it can, we think, contemplate a continuing course of conduct." Central Standard
Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 I1. 2d 566, 573, 141 N.E.2d 45, 50 (1957) (dictum). But see
Jesser v. Mayfair Hotel, Inc., 316 S.W.2d 465, 478 (Mo. 1958).
42 Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, supra note 41; Polikoff v. Dole & Clark
Bldg. Corp., 37 Ill. App. 2d 29, 184 N.E.2d 792 (1962) (dictum).
" Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 I1. 2d 208, 221, 170 N.E.2d 131, 138
(1960).
"Polikoff v. Dole 8: Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 Ill. App. 2d 29, 39, 184 N.E.2d 792,
796 (1962) (dissenting opinion). The dissent, it is submitted, is more nearly in
line with both the language of the common law decisions and the tenor of Gidwitz
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The showing of such facts may shift the burden to defendants to
establish the fairness of their position.45 Quite apart from the dis-
cussion as to what need be demonstrated to support a petition for
dissolution under the statutes, the Illinois courts have made clear
that "oppression" is in and of itself a basis for dissolution. "Op-
pression" is an independent ground for relief, not requiring a show-
ing of fraud, illegality, mismanagement, wasting of assets, nor dead-
lock, although those factors might be and frequently are present.46
The Illinois courts have not provided an inclusive definition of
"oppression." But even when used in its ordinary sense the term
may have sufficient substance to be useful.47  The very absence of
definite and restrictive boundaries tends to enhance the flexibility
of the term and may constitute one of the most beneficial aspects of
its inclusion in the statutes. The "oppression" provision has al-
ready been used to justify dissolution where another provision of
the same statute, and precedent construing it, was too narrow to pro-
vide relief.48 The "oppression" provision would seem to be a ready
and Davis. The alleged misconduct (excessive salaries and refusal either to operate
or to sell the assets) and failure of the purposes for which the corporation had been
reorganized (viz. retirement of the Class A stock), in a context in which the ma-
jority alone stood to gain by foreclosure, seems at least to suggest bad faith and to
state a cause of action. Even if the result is supportable, it would seem that the
language of the majority opinion is unduly restrictive.
"r See Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., supra note 44.
A0 "[T]he word 'oppressive' does not necessarily savor of fraud, and ... the absence
of 'mismanagement, or misapplication of assets' does not prevent a finding that the
conduct... has been oppressive." Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 Ill. 2d
566, 573, 141 N.E.2d 45, 50 (1959). "It is not necessary that fraud, illegality or even
loss be shown to exhibit oppression." Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 IlL.
2d 208, 214-15, 170 N.E.2d 131, 138 (1960).
AT The court in Re H.R. Harmer, Ltd. [1958] 3 All E.R. 689 (CA.), for example,
did not labor with definitions in a situation arising under § 210 of the British Companies
Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38 (see note 30 supra). "[O]ppression must be given its
ordinary sense." Id. at 698. The court gaid simply and graphically, "he [father-
majority shareholder in family corporation] rode roughshod over his sons and every-
body else... in some instances in disregard of the best interest of the company itself."
Id. at 706.
48 Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 IIl. 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960). In
Gidwitz defendant owned 50% of the stock in a closely held, deadlocked corporation,
which he had managed and controlled for ten years as president. During that time,
he had acted in an "arbitrary and highhanded manner" in numerous transactions,
particularly in relation to control of his employment and salaries. Plaintiff, who like-
wise held 50% of the shares, was completely excluded from management. The dead-
lock provision of the involuntary dissolution statute, and strong precedent, required a
showing of irreparable injury to the corporation. Inasmuch as this could not be
shown, the court relied upon the "oppressive" provision. See 74 HARv. L. R1v. 1461
(1961).
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tool for dealing with situations not falling within the more definitive
subsections of the acts. It may be expected to afford relief in a variety
of situations that range from exclusion from management in a family
corporation 49 to deliberate destruction of a subsidiary by the parent
corporation. 50
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE APPROPRIATENESS
OF DISSOLUTION AS THE REMEDY FOR OPPRESSION
Even after characterizing the conduct of directors or controlling
interests as "oppressive" or violative of some "fiduciary duty," courts
often select some remedy other than dissolution.' Whether the fact
of "oppression" justifies dissolution in a particular case would seem
to depend on a weighing of additional factors and counterfactors
which often remain inarticulated.
Both at common law and under statute, the corporations most
frequently dissolved have been those closely held. The peculiar
incidents of the close corporation make such a result predictable and
easily explainable.12  Close corporations are often little more than
incorporated partnerships. Stock ownership may be fairly evenly
distributed among the members of one or two families. Formalities
are usually relaxed, and the affairs of the corporation are normally
directed on the basis of consensus and cooperation. In this context,
misconduct, dissension, deadlock and bad faith assume special sig-
10 Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., supra note 48.
10 See Scottish Co-op. Wholesale Soc'y, Ltd. v. Meyer, [1958] 3 All E.R. 66, 71 (H.L.)
(ScoL).
51 Cf. text accompanying note 7 supra. The Model Act type statutes are generally
permissive and dissolution remains in the discretion of the court even after oppressive
conduct has been shown. The nature of the statutes in this respect was emphasized
in a recent decision under the deadlock provision of a Model Act type statute. Jack-
son v. Nicolai-Neppach Co., 219 Ore. 560, 348 P.2d 9 (1959). The statutes are fre-
quently directed merely at a claimed jurisdictional deficiency. See text accompany-
ing note 8 supra. The Model Business Corporation Act § 90, for example, is captioned
"Jurisdiction of Court to Liquidate Assets and Business of Corporation." The com-
mittee revising the Model Act in 1950 explained that "such remedies [as appoint-
ment of receiver and dissolution] may be very useful, but the jurisdiction and authority
of the state courts might be in doubt if there is no express statutory provision."
ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr at ix (rev. 1950).
52 The special characteristics and needs of the close corporation, as distinguished
from those of a public issue corporation, have received increasing recognition. See
generally O'NE.AL, CLOsE CORPORAnONs: LAW AND PRAC-rCE (1958); Hornstein, judicial
Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 435 (1953); Latty,
The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34
N.C.L. Ryv. 432 (1956); Oppenheim, The Close Corporation in California-Necessity
of Separate Treatment, 12 HASNGS I.J. 227 (1961); Symposium-The Close Corpora-
tion, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 345 (1957).
[V/ol. 1965: 128
5CORPORATIONS
nificance and may more readily constitute "oppression" of such pro-
portions as to justify dissolution. The restricted market normally
available for the shares of a close corporation makes inappropriate
the frequent judicial pronouncements that a shareholder's remedy
is to sell his shares. A forced marriage of dissident or distrusting
parties in a close corporation may be particularly wasteful, un-
profitable and burdensome. Thus where misconduct by. the directors
or controlling interests is of such a degree as to generate a "justifiable
lack of confidence," 53 dissolution may be the only appropriate
remedy under existing statutes.
However, in spite of these special features, the existence of the
close corporation is, in the view of many, too often regarded as in-
violable.54 In light of equity's successful handling of the dissolu-
tion of partnerships, it is submitted that the courts could utilize the
"oppression" concept to make the remedy of dissolution more readily
available to minority shareholders of close corporations.as
In determining whether dissolution is the appropriate remedy,
courts frequently give special attention to the prospects for the
future.5 6 While derivative actions for waste and other relief require
an examination of past conduct, actions for dissolution demand addi-
tionally an appraisal of the future. The courts may look for a
"pattern of conduct by the dominant shareholders and a disposition
on their part to continue the pattern"57 that is violative of the
rights and interests of the minority. Where the future holds "no
hope of abatement," or where the majority is "incorrigible,"58 dis-
"See note 18 supra.
""This sacred cow has all too often been an effective road block in cases where
the over-all best interests of the owners of the enterprise call for its dissolution or
liquidation." Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of Deadlock
and Dissolution, 19 U. Cm. L. Rv. 778 (1952). "[P]articipants frequently suffer eco-
nomically when their business is terminated. Yet in a close corporation, far more often
than is commonly supposed, dissolution is the only answer." O'NAL, op. cit. supra
note 50, at § 9.03. Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate Abuse-Judicial Power to Wind
Up a Corporation at the Suit of a Minority Stockholder, 40 COLUM. L. R.v. 220 (1940).
"The functional similarities between partnerships and close corporations have
received significant attention, chiefly from the writers, but occasionally from the courts.
See, e.g., In re Yenidje Tobacco Co., [1916] 2 Ch. 426. One writer sets forth the
liberal dissolution provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act in suggesting guidelines
for increased use of dissolution in the case of close corporations. Israels, supra note 54,
at 789. See 1 O'NFA, op. cit. supra note 52, at § 5.02; Oppenheim, supra note 52, at 254.
"6 Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill. 2d 208, 220, 170 N.E.2d 131, 138
(1960).
3T Bellevue Gardens, Inc. v. Hill, 297 F.2d 185, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
8 One writer has suggested that majority incorrigibility appeared consistently as a
factor in the common law dissolution decrees. TINGLE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 43.
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solution may be in order. Such a condition may be precipitated
by a single act or a continuing course of conduct. It is submitted that
this approach, which "is not so much to rake up the past as to redeem
the future,"' 9 is sound and helpful, and should be utilized in deter-
mining whether "oppression" is of a nature to warrant dissolution.
In light of the history of the dissolution remedy and the deference
paid to the mythical corporate creature, the foregoing considerations
and arguments for dissolution could hardly be expected to go un-
opposed. The New York courts, in considering shareholder petitions
for dissolution, have been particularly conscious of what they term
"injury to the public."0 This phrase would seem to serve as a con-
venient rubric for such factors as the effect of dissolution upon em-
ployees, customers, contractors and creditors. However, this does
not mean that dissolution will be limited to small corporations with
few customers or employees. 60
The value to be realized from the forced sale of the corporate
assets may also cause courts to balk at ordering dissolution even
though oppressive conduct has been shown.62 The nature of the
assets, whether they be specialized machinery or good will, may
make predictable a disproportionately low receipt upon dissolu-
tion, and a court might be justified in appointing a temporary re-
ceiver to monitor the affairs of the corporation or to employ some
other remedy. However, the extent of the majority misconduct, the
probability that the majority will be buying the assets at the forced
sale, the rate at which the value of the assets are declining, and the
proportion of the loss from forced sale that will be borne by the
wrongdoing majority may nonetheless justify the loss of value oc-
casioned by liquidation.
CONCLUSION
Circumstances which may give rise to "oppression" are "so infi-
.nitely various that it is impossible to define them with precision."08 It
"'Re H.R. Harmer, Ltd., [1958] 3 All. E.R. 689, 696 (CA.).
60See, e.g., In re Radom v. Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954); In re
Seamerlin Operating Co., 307 N.Y. 407, 121 N.E.2d 392 (1954). The New York statute
providing for dissolution of a deadlocked corporation specifically establishes as a
standard that dissolution is to be "beneficial to the stockholder or members and not
injurious to the public." N.Y. GEri. CoRP. LAw § 117.
'
1 See, e.g., Henry v. Ide, 208 Ala. 33, 93 So. 860 (1922); Hall v. City Park Brewing
Co., 294 Pa. 127, 143 At. 582 (1928).
2 Se Patton v. N'icholas, 154 Tex. 385, 398, 279 S.W.2d 848, 854 (1955).
63 Re H.R. Harmer, Ltd., [1958] 3 All E.R. 689, 698-99.
[Vol. 1965: 128
CORPORATIONS
might be added, moreover, that any attempt to define "oppressive"
would tend to reduce the flexibility of the provision. "Oppressive"
is no less vague or abstruse than "fiduciary duty" or "trust relation-
ship," phrases which have been productively employed. The term
has sufficient definition, substance and legal currency to warrant
additional usage in Model Act states.
If, as numerous courts have indicated, the statutory remedy is
to be considered exclusive,4 it should at least be construed to in-
clude the pre-existing common law bases for granting dissolution.
Insofar as this may be done without unduly torturing the familiar
meaning of the word, "oppressive" should be employed in the Model
Act states to provide equivalent coverage. While some of the pro-
visions of the Model Act have built-in limitations, such as a
requisite showing of irreparable damage in the case of deadlock,
"oppression" has not been so restricted. The existing decisions
under the statute, except for unnecessarily broad reservations in one
opinion, 5 reflect a recognition of the latitude of the provision and
represent some willingness to extend its use beyond the common law
situations.
Although statutory phrases such as "just and equitable" 66 and
"in a manner unfairly pre-judicial" 67 may be more malleable, "op-
pressive" would seem pliable enough to extend ample protection to
the rights of the minority. The logical point of departure for de-
termining what those rights are would seem to be the shareholder's
reasonable expectations, which will differ depending upon the
nature of the corporation and other circumstances. These may ex-
tend from the expectation that the corporation will be run honestly
and ratably for the benefit of all the shareholders to the expectation
that the shareholder will be allowed to participate in management.
If it appears that these anticipated prerogatives are to be continually
thwarted in the future, the conduct may appropriately be con-
sidered oppressive within the meaning of the statute.
", See note 10 supra.
Or Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 I1. App. 2d 29, 184 N.E.2d 792 (1962).
See note 44 supra.
60 See, e.g., The Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 222.
07 See Heerey, Shareholder's Petition in Cases of Oppression, 36 Ausm. LJ. 187, 192
n.62 (1963).
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